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In this paper we examine the sensitivity of existing results in
the equilibrium analysis offiscal policyto assumptions about the
slope of the long-run supply curve of capital. In the 'standard'
model, based on the neoclassical growth model, the long-run sup-
ply ofcapitalis perfectly elastic at the representativeagent'sfixed
rate oftime preference. This assumption is shown to have strong
implications for the effects ofgovernment consumption purchases
on output, employment, interest rates and other macroeconoruic
variables. We explore the implications of relaxing this assump-
tion in a more general model that allows for flexible time prefer-
ence. We show that the multiplier effect of permanent changes
in government purchases on output is enhanced, primarily as a
result ofincreased capital accumulation. In an interesting Key-
nesian twist, private consumption may in fact rise in response to
increased government purchases.
1 Introduction
Perfectly elastic or perfectly inelastic supply or demand curves have
much to recommend them. Equilibrium analysis which would otherwise
be fraught with ambiguity yields forth sharp predictions when one as-
sumes either demand or supply are either perfectly elastic or inelastic.
Nonetheless, this is not the way we typically teach equilibrium analysis
nor, in most circumstances, perform it. Neoclassical macroeconomics is
an exception to this rule. More generally, capital accumulation mod-
els in which a representative agent maximizes the standard additively-
separable, fixed-discount-faetor utility function-to which class most
equilibriumbusiness cycle models belong-implya long run supply curve
Ifor capital which is perfectly elasticat the agent's fixed rate oftime pref-
erence.
This property of the what we will refer to as the 'standard' model
is, and has been, well-known and well-criticized, even by users of the
standard modeJ.l The present paper should not be seen as a general
condemnation of that model. All modelling must strike some balance
between tractability and realism; it is because reality is so intractable
that we have need for models at all.
However, the question of exactly where and when this assumption
ceases to be innocuous-i.e., for what sorts of experiments it is or isn't
a harmless simplification-has been given surprisingly short shrift.2 A
number of instances where this assumption could be important suggest
themselves, one instance in particular being the recent literature on the
dynamicgeneral equilibriumeffects offiscal policy. The way to interpret
the present exercise---Qr at least our intent-is as a 'robustness check'
of the standard model with particular regard to this branch of the neo-
classical macroeconomics literature.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we
summarizesome recent results in the equilibriumanalysisoffiscal policy,
as well as demonstrate some properties of the standard model which will
be important for our subsequent analysis. Section 3 of the paper lays
out a more general framework, which allows for a non-zero slope to
capital's long-run supply. The section begins with a description of the
type of preferences we will use, and then sets about solving the more
general model and characterizing its equilibrium in terms of efficiency
conditions.
Our analysis of fiscal policy proper is then undertaken from two
perspectives, a 'comparative steady state' analysis-exploring the two
models' differing responses to truly permanent changes in government
purchases-and a quantitative, numerical analysis of the effects of both
transitory and persistent changes on the models' complete dynamical
1In par1ialequilibrium, it implies an 'all or nothing' typeofbellavioral response--
when faced with constant interest rates, agents wish to hold either no capital or an
infinite amount. In general equilibrium, unless all agents share the same common
discount factor, all capital ends up in the hands of the most patient agent; when
agents share the same discount factor, the long-run distribution of capital holdings
across agents is indeterminate. See, for eJUlJIlple, Becker [6].
2A recent exception is a paper of Gomme and Greenwood [14), which utilizes
an endogenous time preference specification similar to ours in a real business cycle
model. These sorts of preferences have also, quite naturally, shown up in the open
economy macro literature, where for a small open economy fixity of time preference
implies.an indeterminacy in the economy'. long-run debt position. The need to get
away from fixed rates of time preference is here very clear and has been addressed,
for example, by Mendoza [23].
2systems.
Thesteadystateanalysis, in section 4, is particularlyuseful for devel-
oping the intuition of what makes models with flexible time preference
'different.' We begin by demonstrating that permanent changes in pur-
chases can have long-run output effects'even absent elastic labor supply,
a result impossible in the standard model. The output effect here is
fully attributable to capital accumulation. Putting elastic labor supply
back into the model, this 'capital accumulation effect' is shown to ac-
count for much of the difference in the sizes of the output effects which
the fixed- and flexible-discount-factor models generate. In particular,
under reasonable parameter values, introducing flexible time preference
in a manner consistent with an upward-sloping long-run capital supply
curve can generate much larger output effects-'multipliers'-than the
standard model, while keeping the employment effect basicallythe same.
Also, permanent changes in government purchases, even when financed
through lump-sum taxes, give rise to long-run interest rate effects in
the more general model. In a somewhat Keynesian twist, steady-state
consumption may actually rise in response to a permanent increase in
purchases, depending on the value assigned to a parameter which gauges
the responsiveness of time preference to changes in consumption and
leisure. The agent is, nonetheless, worse off as a result.
Section 5 contains our analysis of the effects of both transitory and
persistent changes in government purchases on output, employment, in-
vestment and so forth in both the short and long runs. In particular,
following the numerical solution techniques outlined in [20], we approx-
imate the models' dynamics in a linear fashion and report responses of
the approximate dynamical systems to deviations in purchases which
display different degrees of persistence. We find that the results of Bax-
ter and King [5] and Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum [1]-that
transitory shocks to purchases yield smaller output effects than persis-
tent shocks-continue to obtain even in our more general framework.
In the case of transitory shocks, we find that the impact effects on em-
ployment, consumption and output are much larger, and the impact ef-
fect on investment much smaller, in the flexible-time preference model,
though the propagation is significantly weaker-the transition back to
the steady state is quite rapid. The same is true for the responses of
the real wage and the real interest rate. In the case of persistent-in
fact 'nearly permanent'-shocks, the effects at impact on all quantity
and price variables are qualitatively the same across the two models,
but much larger in the more general model. Subsequent to impact, the
differing responses of the two models is accounted for largely by the
'capital accumulation effect' which arose in our steady state analysis.
32 The equilibrium approach to fiscal policy
The 'equilibrium approach to fiscal policy' analyzes the effects of gov-
ernment purchases, distortionary taxes, government financing rules, con-
scription, etc. within explicit models of dynamic general equilibrium,
emphasizing the supply-side responses of capital and labor to various
policies, rather than the usual Keynesian demand-side response of con-
sumption and income.3 Like much of the equilibrium business cycle
literature, the equilibrium approach to fiscal policy utilizes the stan-
dard neoclassical growth model, fleshed out, of course, to include taxes,
government purchases, productive government investment and so forth.
The recent papers of Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum [IJ and Bax-
ter and King [5J provide a good summary of the main results thus far in
the 'equilibrium approach.'
Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum have shown analytically, and
Baxter and King via numerical simulations, that the basic neoclassi-
cal stochastic growth model augmented to incorporate government pur-
chases yields results on the magnitudesofeffects on output ofpersistent
and transitory changes in purchases which contradict the arguments
given by Barro [3J and Hall [16]. In particular, persistent changes in
government purchases are shown to have a larger effect on output than
transitory changes. Numerically, both Baxter and King and Aiyagari,
Christiano and Eichenbaum have shown that for some parametrizations
of the model, for persistent changes in government spending, one does
get true spending 'multipliers' in the sense of unit changes in spend-
ing leading to greater-than-unit changes in output.4 Baxter and King
have also shown that the government's financing decision is, in some
cases, more important than the resource costs ofgovernment purchases,
and that productive government investment can have large effects on
private-sectoroutput and investment.
At a purely analytical level, these results of course rely on the fact
that the preferences which the authors specify are of the standard time-
additively separable, fixed-discount-factor variety. This is true of many
results. At an intuitive level, though, thefixityofthe rate oftime prefer-
3Early work in this area was done by Aschauer [2] and Barro [4], though these
analyses utilized models either without elastic labor supply [4] or without capital [2).
Much more complete treatments are given by Aiyagari, Christiano and Eichenbaum
[1) and, especially, Baxter and King [5], who consider a thorough list offiscal policy
experiments.
4Throughont, we use the terms 'multiplier' and [multiplier effects' to denote cases
where increases in government spending yield greater than one-for-one increases in
output. Cases where changes in government spending lead to any changes in output,
not necessarily more than one 4 for-one, we refer to simply as Contput effects.'
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ence should be important simply because the implied long-run supply of
capital pins down the steady-state real interest rate, to which the model
must return subsequent to any shock to purchases.
That a fixed rate of time preference sharpens the derivationofmulti-
plier effects for permanent changes in government purchases is apparent
enough from simply considering the deterministic steady state of the
basic neoclassical growth model augmented to incorporate government
purchases.5 Since much of the basic framework will be used throughout
our analysis, it's worth stating that framework formally at the outset.
Here and below, F is a constant-returns-to-scale production function
with capital, k, and labor, n, as inputs. Expected lifetime utility, with
the rate of time preference fixed, is given by
Eo {~t'tu(ct, 1 - n,)}
where c is consumption and 1 - n is leisure, the agent's per-period en-
dowment of discretionary time having been normalized to unity. Each
period the economy faces a resource constraint of the form
(2)
where 8 is the depreciation rate of capital and 9 denotes government
purchases. We abstract from distortionary taxation in order to focus
solely on the effects ofgovernment purchases as a pure drain on output.6
Further, optimaand equilibria will continue to coincide under lump-sum
financing, so we may treat the equilibrium as the solution to an optimal
growth problem-maximizing (1) subject to (2) at each date-given a
stochastic process for government purchases.
"The deterministic steady state of this model-setting gt = 9 for all
t-is described by three equations. The three equations are a labor-
market-clearing equation-i.e., the intratemporal efficiency condition
equating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure to the real wage; a capital-market-clearing equation-the steady
state version of the consumption Euler equation; and the steady state
version of the resource constraint:7
(3)
5This is essentially the tack taken by King in [19].
"Baxter and King [5], however, have shown that tbe presence of distortionary
taxation has important implications within the standard model, and this would no
doubt be true in our model as well. The presence ofdistortionary taxes also renders
important the question offinancing.
7Here and elsewhere, the notation Dd denotes the ith partial derivative of the
function t, and Di;f the jth partial derivative of D;f .
51/{3 = D,F(k,n)+1-0
F(k, n) - ok = c+g.
(4)
(5)
With F assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, equilibrium
in the capital market-equation (4)-pins down the long-run capital-
labor ratio independent of g. [See Figure 1) Consequently, the right
hand side of (3) is fixed as well-in essence labor demand is rendered
perfectly elastic at a fixed real wage, independent of 9 as well. Let
z == kin and f(z) = F(z, 1) - oz. Let z* denote the capital-labor ratio
determined by the capital market clearing condition. The question of
whether multipliers exist boils down to calculating the derivative of the
function n(g) defined implicitly by
D2u(nf(z*) - g,1-n) = f(z*) _ z*f'(z*).
D,u(nf(z*) - g, 1- n)
A multiplier will exist whenever n'(g) > 1/f(Z*).8 It is straightforward
to show that there are specifications of u, F, {3, 0 and 9 yielding this
result. Given that we have relatively more confidence, empirically, in
what the last four primitives on this list should look like than we do
in regard to u, the existence proposition would typically be stated as
"long-run multipliers will exist if leisure is sufficiently income-elastic."
What's going on here can be visualized in a simple graph with con-
sumption on one axis and leisure on the other. [See Figure 2) Given
that the capital-labor ratio has been determined in the capital mar-
ket, the long run equilibrium occurs at the intersection of two curves in
consumption-leisure space. One curve is simply the 'income expansion
path'ofu(c, I) when the wage rateis given by w(z*) = f(z*)-z*f'(z*)-
i.e., the collection of all pairs (c,l) with D2u(c,I)/D,u(c, I) = w(z*).
Theothercurverepresents thelocus offeasible consumption-leisurepairs
given the capital-labor ratio z*. It is the downward-sloping straight line
determined by the equation c = (1 -I) f(z*) - g. Permanent changes in
9 induce parallel shifts in this 'budget line', and the magnitude of the
resulting changes in leisure--equivalently, labor-depend on the slopes
of the 'income expansion path' and 'budget line' near the equilibrium.
[See Figure 3)
Since the capital-labor ratio is fixed, any change in n is implicitly
accompanied by an equal-proportioned change in k. Also, changes in
output are proportional to changes in labor as well, and steady state
consumption clearly falls. Obviously, in such a model, permanent-i.e.,
steady state-changes in 9 have no interest rate effects.
8Since, with y = nf(z*), dy/dg = n'(g) f(z*).
6The natural experiment to conduct would then be to demonstrate--
given accepted parametrizations of F, f3 and g---exactly how 'income-
elastic' leisure has to be. In percentageterms, since a one percent change
in leisure yields a - (1 - n) In percent change in labor, a moderate re-
sponsiveness of leisure can yield a large responsiveness of labor.9 One
would then ask whether the set of numbers which are "sufficient" over-
lap with the set of numbers which are "plausible."lo Our contention is
not that this is an unreasonable way to approach the problem; rather,
it IS that what is "sufficient" no doubt depends on the rather special
assumption of a perfectly elastic long-run supply of capital. The aim
of the present research is to explore the implications of relaxing that
assumption. We might then consider whether the "sufficient" and the
"plausible" grow nearer together or farther apart as capital's long-run
supply becomes less than perfectly elastic.
3 A More General General Equilibrium Model
Epstein [IIJ has shown that members ofthe class ofstationary recursive
utility functions consistent with expected utility must take the form
U({Ct}) = E {~u (Ct)exp [-~v (cs )] }
in the case of a single consumption good. Intuitively, and in theory, if
labor supply is elastic, there's no reason why this cannot be modified to
(6) U({Ct, n,}) = E {~B'U(c" 1 - n,)}




B, = IIf3[u(C., 1- ns)J·
8=0
(7)
That is, the utility discount factor f3 which an agent applies each period
to next-period's utility depends on how mum utility he or she received
'Following King, op. cit., estimatesofthe long-run fraction ofdiscretionary hours
devoted to labor range variously from two-tenths to one-third, implying (1 - n)In
in the range of two to four.
IOFor example, Pencavel [251.
7this period, rather than on c, and n, directly. It's probably clearer here
to look at the aggregator representation:
u, = u(Ct, 1 - n,) +/1[u(c" 1 - ndJ E,Ut+1' (8)
This differs from the time-additive case only in the dependence of /1
on current utility u. We say this form is suggested for reasons of 'par-
simony' because simply saying /1 = /1(c, 1 - n) would imply having to
sp<;lcify numbers like D12/1(C, 1 - n), whereas the form we propose only
requires elasticities like u/1'(u) //1(u) and u/1"(u)/ /1'(u) to be specified.
Furthermore, as will become clear, this form of flexible discounting does
not alter the agent's intratemporal consumption-leisure choice.
As in the standard model described above, when we restrict our at-
tention to government spending financed through lump-sum taxes, op-
timaand equilibriacontinueto coincide in the moregeneral model under
mild convexity, monotonicity and interiority assumptions. Characteriz-
ing equilibria, then, amounts to characterizingsolutions to the problem
of maximizing (6) subject to the sequence of resource constraints (2)
given ko and a stochastic process for 9,.
There are a number ofways to think about solving this problemfrom
an analyticalstandpoint. The choice we make here is to set the problem
in a standard discrete-timeoptimalcontrolframework, using a technique
introduced by Obstfeld [24J ina continuous-time context. Pick any fixed
/1 between zero and one. The utility function can then be written as
00




X, = (1//1)'II/1[u(c.,1- ns)J.
s=o
Importantly, Xl can be incorporated as an added state variable, and its
definition can be written as the state-transition equation
/1 [u (Ct, 1- n,)]
Xl+! = /1 X, (9)
together with the initial condition Xo = 1. The completeproblem is then
given by
maxEo {~/1'X'U (Ct, 1 - nd} (10)
subject to the state-transition constraints for X" equation (9), and for
capital k,:
k,+! = F(k"l- n,)+(1- 8)k, - 9' - c, (11)
8plus initial conditions, ko given and Xo = l.
Letting Adenote the costate for capital and /l the costate for x, the






fJ' (ut)} XtD2ut X 1+/It fJ = AtD2Ft
At = fJEtAt+l {DiF,+! +1 - 6}
/It = fJEt {Ut+l +fJ (Ut+d /It+l}
as well as the two original transition equations, (9) and (11).
In principle, the first two equations (12) and (13) generate solutions
for the controls, Ct andnt, as functions ofkt, x" At and /It. Pluggingthese
into the four state and costate equations, and specifying a transition
for the forcing variable g, yields a five-variable first order stochastic
difference equation system, which completely summarizes the dynamics
of the model given initial conditions and transversality conditions.
Note that the steady state values of the quantities k, c and n-given
a constant g-are independent of the choice of the number fJ. So, a
naturalway to proceed is to first calculatesteadystatecand ii, and then
set the number fJ equal to fJ [u (c, 1 - ii)l. Alternatively, if the steady
state value of the discount factor is a parameter we wish to impose in
quantitative experiments, we would choose the number f3 equal to this
parameter, and parametrize the function fJ ( .) to guarantee consistency
with this choice. The latter method is in fact the one we will adopt in
our numerical simulations.
In our quantitative analysis, as should be clear from the first order
conditions above, linearization yields coefficients involving elasticities
of fJ(u)-ufJ'(u) j fJ(u), which we will subsequently denote by vu, and
ufJ"(u) jfJ'(u), which we denote by Vuu' The fixed-discount-factor case
can then be recovered by setting both of these parameters equal to zero.
The results we obtain-andin fact the stabilityofthe dynamicsystem-
when Vu and Vuu are non-zero will depend on both the sizes and signs of
these parameters. The appendix discusses stability restrictions on these
and other parameters, though at this point it's worthwhile to discuss
at least one important choice which we make-the sign of fJ'(u). Since
utility is increasing in consumption and leisure, which are in turn in-
creasing in income, we are in fact asking a well-worn question-dating
back to Fisher [15] and Hayek [17l-as to whether impatience increases
or decreases with income.
9The case of /3' > O-so that increases in within-period-utility bring
the discount factor closer to one-can be thought of as reflecting some
ideathat the more happiness I receive today, the more 'patient' I become
with respect to future happiness. Conversely, {3' < 0 corresponds to the
equally arguable notion that the more happiness I receive today, the less
I care about future installments of happiness.
Perhaps the most compelling case-offeredoriginally by Hayek, sub-
sequentlyformalized by Epstein [11], Lucas and Stokey [22] andothers-
is that {3' < 0 guarantees long-run stabilityin the one-sector model. This
is most easily seen by abstracting for a moment from labor supply. If
labor supply were inelastic, then one could think of 1/{3 [tL(f(k) - k)]
as representing the long-run supply curve for capital. Then, at least
for values of k with f (k) - k increasing, /3' < 0 corresponds to an
upward-sloping long-run supply curve. This, in fact, is the assumption
we maintain throughout our analysis.u
4 Long-run Output Effects
To get a feel for the impact offlexible timepreference, it's worth initially
considering the deterministic steady state of a model otherwise identi-
cal to ours, but with inelastic labor supply.12 That is, suppose utility
is defined only over consumption, and output depends only on capital,
or equivalently capital per worker. Again let f denote the neoclassi-
cal production function in 'per worker' form, net of depreciation-i.e.,
f (k)= F (k, 1) - lik. When time preference is fixed, the steady state is
determined by the familiar conditions
c = f(k) - 9
and
{3f'(k) = l.
Obviously, capital-henceoutput-isindependentof9, and consequently
any change in 9 is exactly offset by a change in consumption, c. There
IILawrence [21], using PSID data, finds evidence that subjective discount factors
rise with laborincome, though it'snot dearwhat implicationthis has for our assump-
tion ofP' < O. In particular, individual rates of time preference in her specification
are assumed to be independent of individual consumption. The Euler equations
which she uses to obtain her estimates are thus identical to the ones the standard
model would generate, except in that the p's are allowed to differ across individuals.
Further, as a little algebra applied to the impulses responses we later report will
show, the discount factor and labor income are positively related in the experiments
we conduct as well.
12Devereux [8] was the first to address the effects offiscal policy in the context of
a model such as this with flexible time preference. However] his primary focus was
on the response of interest rates to temporary and permanent spending shocks.
10are no output effects of permanent changes in 9 in this setting.
Now, consider what happens when time preference is endogenous.
Let (3 depend on u(c). The steady state is now determined by the re-
source constraint, given above, and a new version ofthe Euler equation-
(3[u(cl]f'(k) = 1.
In this case, changes in 9 are not offset one-for-one by changes in con-
sumption, and in fact when (3' < 0 the steady state capital stock and
steady-state output rise-though output rises less than one-for-oneP
Plug the resource constraint c = I(k) - 9 into the Euler equation and
differentiate to obtain
dk (3'u'J' 1(3'1 u'J'
-- - >0
dg - (3'u' (J,]2 +(31" - 1(3'1 u' (J,]2 +(31!"1 .
Since output depends only on k, the associated change in steady state
output is given by
dy ,dk 1(3'1 u' [J'12
dg = I dg = 1(3'1 u'[f'J2 + (311"1'
'which is positive, but clearly less than one. Nonetheless, there is an out-
put effect, deriving solely from increased capital, or capital per worker,
which is not the case in the fixed-time-preference model. That is, even
with inelastic labor supply, the mere introduction of an upward-sloping
long-run supply of capital gives rise to steady-state output effects of
government spending.
What we'll see subsequently is that in the full model-incorporating
a labor-leisure choice-flexibility of time preference adds a 'capital ac-
cumulationeffect' to the standard income effect on labor supply to yield
larger multipliers than the standard model. That is, for reasonable pa-
rameter values, the employment effect of a permanent change in gov-
ernment spending is approximately the same whether time preference
is fixed or flexible. But, in the case of flexible time preference, a posi-
tive effect on the capital-labor ratio leads to larger effects of government
spending on output than occur within the standard model.
The deterministic steady state of the full model, now allowing for
elastic labor supply, is still relatively simple-at least compared to the
various formulations of the full dynamical system which we will discuss
below. It is determined by three conditions which yield steady values
for c, k and n. They are (1) the steady state resource constraint c =
13As discussed above, the condition fJ' < 0 guarantees an upword slope of the
long-run capital supply curve.





-and (3) the Euler equation governing the capital market-
1 = ,B[u(c, 1 - n)] {D,F(k, n) + 1-Ii}.
The fact that the intratemporal efficiency condition is unchanged from
the fixed-discount-factor case is a consequence of adopting a rate of
time preference which depends on current-period utility, rather than
consumption and leisure directly. This fact is easily seen from the first-
order conditions (12) and (13) above.
It's instructive to cast this equilibrium in terms similar to those used
above in discussing the fixed-discount-factor case--namely, thinking in
termsofconsumption, labor (or leisure) and the capital-laborratio. Sup-
pose that the capital-labor ratio, z, is given. Then, the intratemporal
efficiency condition again defines an 'income expansion path' consisting
of pairs (c, I) such that D2u/D,U = D2F(z,l) = j(z) - zj'(z). The
resource constraint again determines a downward-sloping straight line
given by c = {F(z,l) -liz}n - 9 = f(z)(I-I) - g. The intersection
of the two curves yields choices of consumption and leisure given z and
g-call them c(z,g) and I(z,g). [Just as in Figure 2] The key feature of
the fixed-discount factor case--as we've already seen-is that the equi-
librium value of z is determined.independent of 9 by:
f'(z·) = 1/fl·
The effect in that case on I, say, of a change·in 9 is simply the direct
effect embodied in the definition of I(z·,g)-which again amounts to
moving along the fixed income expansion path. Now, however, z is not
determined so simply and independently. In a slight abuse of notation,
let u(z,g) = u[c(z,g),I(z,g)]-that is, u(z,g) is the value of utility
consistent with theresource constraint and intratemporalefficiency given
values for both z and g. The equilibrium value of z in the f1exible-
discount-factor case is then determined by the capital market condition
j'(z) = 1/,B[u(z,g)].
The solution to this equation-assumingoneexists-willgive the steady
state capital-labor ratio as a function of g-z(g), say. [See Figure 4]
Going back to the 'intratemporal' picture yields up c(g) = c(z(g) ,g)
and I(g) = I(z(g) ,g).
12Now, one can show under standard assumptions that u(z,g) is in-
creasing in z, for a given value ofg, and decreasing in g, for a given value
of z. If we assume that (3' < 0, 1/(3[u(z,g)] defines an upward-sloping
long-run supply curvefor capital-actuallyfor z-in the space with z on
the horizontal axis and the real interest rate on the vertical axis. Given
what we've said about the dependence of u(z,g) on g, and (3 on u, the
supply schedule will shift out-i.e., down and to the right-in response
to an increase in g. [See Figure 5J
.Now, suppose the economy is in a steady state, given a constant
level of purchases g. A permanent increase in purchases from 9 to
9 + t>.g, say, will impact simultaneously on the steady-state values of
C, nand z. Heuristically, though, it's instructive to view the change
in the equilibrium through 'partial equilibrium' glasses-and in terms
ofour two diagrams characterizing the consumption-leisure choice given
the capital-labor ratio and the long-run capital market. Given the origi-
nal steady state value of z, an increase in government spending impacts
on the consumption-leisure choice by shifting downward in parallel fash-
ion the 'budget line' in the consumption-leisure diagram-just as in the
fixed-discount-factor model. [See Figure 6] This has the effect of low-
ering consumption and leisure-i.e., increasing labor-as well as lower-
ing the steady state flow of utility u. In the fixed-discount-factor case,
this would be the end of the story, but here the change in u impacts
on discounting and hence the capital market. The long-run supply of
capital shifts out, leading to a lower steady state interest rate and a
higher capital-labor ratio. [Again as in Figure 5] The increased capital-
labor ratio in turn impacts on the consumption-leisure choice, affecting
both the 'income expansion path'-rotating it upward-and the 'bud-
get line'-increasingits slope and vertical intercept. The contributionof
this second adjustment is clearly positive with respect to consumption-
relativeto theinitial'fixed-z' movement-andambiguouswith respect to
leisure. Allowing the capital-labor ratio to adjust can mean either more
or less leisure taken in the steady state, relative to the initial fixed-z
effect. If we think of the fixed-z effect as the new steady state of the
fixed-discount-factor model, then allowing for a flexible discount factor
implies an employment effect which can be greater than, less than, or
equal to the fixed-discount-factor employment effect.
Suppose the shifts in the 'budget line' and 'income expansion path'
engendered by the adjustment of z lead to roughly the same level of
steady-state employment as was the case when z was held fixed. Is it
then the casethat the steady-state outputeffect should be the same in ei-
ther case? The answer is no, since when the capital-labor ratio changes,
movements in output are no longer proportional to movements in labor
13hours-and here, recalling the outwardshift ofcapital's long-run supply,
we have an increase in the capital-labor ratio. Thus, even when intro-
ducing flexibilityof the discount factor engenders no difference in steady
state employment effects, effects on output are always magnified, rela-
tive to the fixed-discount-factor case, by the accumulation of additional
steady-state capital.
This scenario is, roughly speaking, exactly what plays itselfout-when
the model is evaluated numerically, given standard parameter values.
Precisely, given values for things like factor income shares, expenditure
shares, the steady-state interest rate and parameters of u at an original
steady state, the changes in c, nand z in response to a small change in
g can be written as functions of a parameter-the elasticity of {3(u)-
to which the slope of capital's long run supply is proportional. For
a wide -range of values for this parameter-which we denote vu-the
employment effect of a given change in steady state g varies slightly, in
fact falling, while the output effect increases rather dramatically as Vu
moves further away from zero, which corresponds to the fixed-discount-
factor case. The enhanced output effects are due almost entirely to
increases in the capital-lahor ratio.
To be concrete, suppose that u is given by
[ ciS] l-u
u(c, I) = .........-"---
I-a
for a > 0, a oil. Stability conditions given in Epstein [11) require that
u < 0, or a > 1, which we assume. Other restrictions on a and ,8(u)-are
discussed in an appendix. We will assume also that F (k, n) = k1-ana.
Differentiation of the capital-market clearing condition yields
-vu(a-l)c+ vu(a-1)8-
1
n it - a(I-I3(I- a)JZ = 0,
-n
where Vu denotes the elasticity of 13(u)j a is labor's share of national
income; and a hat over a variable denotes percentage deviation from -
steady state. The condition ,8' < 0, in conjunction with other conditions
on 13 and u, guarantees an upward slope to the long-run capital supply
curve. Together with the restriction u < 0, this implies that Vu > 0 as
is Vu (a - 1).
Note that when Vu equals zero, the expression reduces to z = 0,
which reflects the fact, mentioned earlier, that the capital-labor ratio is
fixed in the long run in the constant-discount-faetor case.
Differentiation of the intratemporal efficiency condition yields:
. n. ( )' 0 c +--n - 1 - a z = .
I-n
14As one would expect, this expression is as in the standard model.
Similarly, the 'hat' version ofthe resource constraint is also as in the
basic model:
-SeC+ (1 - Si) it + [(1 - a) - Si] 2= s9g,
where the subscripted s's denote steaay-stateoutput shares of consump-
tion, government spending and investment.
.. Notethat Vu , the elasticityoff3(u) enters only intothe capital-market
equation, and even there it is actually Vu (<7 - 1) which matters. Let this
product be denoted bye. Once we specify values for steady state f3, a, 8,
n, 0, and the shares Se, Si and Sg, we can derivesolutions for C/g, itl9and
so forth as functions ofe. Setting e = 0 recovers thefixed discount factor
case. Given solutions for 21g and illg, one can also obtain expressions
for fI!fJ, which is simply ilig + (1- a) 21g, and the 'multiplier' dyldg,
which is simply (1Isg)fllg.
Following standard procedure--and in order to maintain compara-
bility with other results-we set a = .58 and, following Baxterand King
[5], f3 = .94. The parameter 0 is set, given the other parameter values,
so that n = .20 is chosen by the agent in the steady state. We choose
the empirically plausible value of Sg = .20 for government's share.
This leaves the remaining output share parameters-se and si-and
the depreciation rate 8 to be specified. Obviously since the shares must
sum to one, and Sg = .20 has already been chosen, only one output share
remains free to be chosen. When the standard model is 'calibrated'
rather than estimated, the usual procedure is to impose a, f3 and 8,
and let investment's share take on whatever value is necessary to be
consistent with the model's steady state. The standard choice for 8 is
10% per annum. Together with a = .58 and f3 = .94, this implies a
steady-state investment share of slightly less than 26%, which seems to
us quite high.14 If we instead impose investment's share to be a more
.plausible 15%, together with a = .58 and f3 = .94, the depreciation rate
implied by the model is a much smaller 3.55% per annum. IS Which of
the two approaches we choose actually has a significant impact on the
results, as will be seen below.
Results of these exercises as e-i.e., Vu (<7 - I)-variesover (0,1] are
reported in Table 1. The top half is for a 'realistic' investment share
14Furthermore
1 as a simple measurement matter, of the four parameters l the rate
of depreciation is certainly the most problematic. An informal survey of macreo-
conomists confirms this. Respondents were shown the list of four parameters and
asked to name the one in which they had the least confidence in measuring empiri-
cally. Four out of (the) five macroeconomists questioned answered 6.
15Hercowitz [18], using Canadian national accounts data, obtained an estimate of
6 ofabout 5% per annum.
15(.15), but a 'low' depreciation rate (.0355); the bottom for 'standard' de-
preciation (.10), and consequently 'high' investment share (.2564). The
interpretationofthe tables is that for each variablex, what's recorded in
that row are the steady-stateelasticities i:/gfor each value of ~ running
across the top row-so, for example, in the first table, a one percent
permanent increase in g when ~ =-0 engenders a permanent .1976%
increase in labor effort.
5 . The EffectsofTransitory and Persistent Changes
in Government Purchases
We report impulse responses of the full dynamical system to an increase
in government spending under various assumptions as to the persistence
of the disturbance, the steady-share of output devoted to investment,
and the curvature of utility. The results are obtained by treating the
problem in the discrete time optimal control manner outlined in section
3, then following the linearization techniques set forth in King, Plosser
and Rebelo [20].
For all of our simulations, we maintain a 'core' set of parameters:
labor's share of national income, a = .58; government's steady state
share of national output, 89 = .20; and the steady state discount factor,
fJ = .94.
We continue to maintain the momentary utility function u of the
form
[ 19]1-"
U (c, I) = -,-c-,-_
1-(1'
where we again take (1' > 1. For all of the results we report, we set
(1' = 1.5. In all cases we set the parameter () to guarantee that n = .20
in the steady state.
For the full dynamics, both the parameter Vu and vuu-the elasticity
of fJ' (u)-need to be specified. To that end, we adopt a particular
functional form for fJ-
fJ (u) = 1 - e""
-where 1/ > o. We set the value of 1/ to be consistent with the initial
steady-state discount factor {3 = .94 and the steady state level of utility
u.
For the most part, we also adopt the 'realistic investment share, low
depreciation' parameters described in section 4-that is, we impose in-
vestment's share ofoutput to be fifteen percent, implying a depreciation
of3.55% per annum. For comparison, we report some impulse responses
for 'standard depreciation' of ten percent per annum and investment's
share correspondingly 25.64%.
16The process for government spending is assumed, in percentagedevi-
ations from steadystate, tofollow an AR(1) process, with AR parameter
p. We illustrate the effects of a shock to government purchases under
three different assumptions about its persistence. The first is a purely
temporary shock with p = O. The second is a permanent shock, which
is mimicked by setting p arbitrarily close to one (we set p = .9999). The
third is an intermediate case with p = .94, which is the estimated value
reported by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo [7].
.All impulse responses are for a 1% shock to g, and plot the corre-
sponding paths of c, n, k, etc. The horizontal scales in all cases are in
years.
The first set of six pictures, Figure 7, records the responses of con-
sumption, effort, the capital stock, output, the interest rate and the real
wagefor the case ofa purely transitory (p = 0) shock topurchases, under
rY = 1.5 and Si = .15 (6 = .0355). The two paths in the picture of each
variable are that variable's response under flexible time preference-in
all cases the "x' line-and fixed time preference-the '0' line.
Themainfeatures oneobserves inthese responses arethat, first ofall,
flexible timepreference of the sort we have specified yields a qualitatively
similar response for five of the six variables as obtains in the fixed time·
preference case, with output a slight exception in its transition back
to steady state. At impact, in both cases consumption and investment
(not shown) fall, while effort, and hence-because capital is initially
fixed---output, rise. The real wage falls at impact, and the real interest
rate rises. In the second and subsequent periods, capital in both cases
is below its steady state level, owing to the smaller investment in the
impact period. At this point, the transitional dynamics of both models
dictatethat effort and investment should be high, and consumption l()w,
relative to their steady states until the systems converge back to their
original positions. The subsequent paths of output differ in that, in the
fixed time preference case, output falls below its steady state in period
two, and smoothly rises back up, while in the flexible time preference
case, output falls to a level slightly above its steady state, and smoothly
falls the rest of the way in subsequent periods.
Quantitatively, theflexible timepreferenceresponses show much larger
effects at impact on consumption, effort and output than fixed time pref-
erence responses. The same can be said for the at-impact responses of
the real interest rate and the real wage. Accordingly, the response at im-
pact ofinvestment is smaller in the flexible case, and in the subsequent
period the capital stock is nearer to its steady state value than under
fixed time preference. Since the model's transitional dynamics from an
initially low capital stock take over at this point, and since capital is
17not quite so far out of line with its steady state value, the flexible-time-
preference responses show much less propagation of the shock than do
the fixed-time-preference responses.
The greater at-impact responses of consumption and effort-as well
as the smaller response of investment-have a simple diagrammaticex-
planation in terms of the consumption-leisure-investment choice which
the representative agent faces at impact. Given the level of investment
optimal priorto the shock, the transitoryincrease in g has the effect ofa
parallel shift down in today's consumption-leisure possibilities set. Con-
sumption decreases andlabor effort increases. But, theoriginallyoptimal
level of investment is no longer optimal. If we view investment as cho-
sen to equate its marginal cost-the marginal utility of consumption-
with its marginal benefit-the discounted expected marginal value of
capital-then we've had an upward shift in the marginal cost schedule.
In the fixed-discount-factor case, that's all that occurs-eonsequently,
investment is reduced somewhat from its previously optimal level, and
the initial negative effects on consumption and leisure checked some-
what. But, with flexible time preference, the increase in the marginal
cost ofinvestment is accompaniedbyan increase in its marginalbenefit-
since the expected marginal value ofcapital is discounted less as today's
utility falls. Consequently, the adjustment in investment is smaller-so
investment falls by less in the flexible time preference case-and hence
the 'correction' of the initial effects on consumption and effort lessened.
The next set ofsix pictures-Figure8--shows, for the same variables
and parameter values, responses to a 'permanent' (p = .9999) shock to
purchases. As one would expect, for both flexible and fixed time prefer-
ence, the effects at impact on consumption, effort and output are much
larger now-for example, under fixed time preference, the impact mul-
tiplier on output is about.75 in the permanent case versus about .10 in
the purely transitory case.16 There is also now a positiveeffect on invest-
ment, as the increase in the marginal cost of investment is accompanied
now in both fixed and flexible cases by a large increase in the marginal
benefit ofinvestment-ifthe shock is going to be around for awhile, the
marginal value of extra capital for those periods is high. With flexible
time preference, however, we again get a substantial added boost onthe
marginal benefit side due to the change in discounting. Consequently,
the at-impact responses of all variables are larger under flexible time
preference than under fixed time preference. This difference is particu-
larly noticeable in investment-where the difference is by more than a
16Recall that with Sg = .20, the multiplier dyldg is five times the elasticity filii.
Since 91 = 1 in our experiments, the impact multipliers are five times the values of
ill recorded in Figures 7.4 and 8.4.
18factor of five-and in output-where the impact multiplier is now well
over 1.5.
After impact, the dynamics reflect the transitions of the variable
to their 'new steady states.' As our comparative steady state analysis
showed, the difference between fixed and flexible time preference in this
regard is dominatedby thedesire togreatlyincreasesteady-statecapital.
.The paths of the interest rate and real wage under flexible time pref-
er~nce areprecisely what one wouldexpect given the movements in labor
effort and capital-afterlarge impact effects, both quickly settle to their
new steady states, the interest rate lower, the real wage higher.
The third set of pictures-Figure 9-illustrate the effect of a shock
to purchases when the persistence parameteris chosen to match postwar
US data, p = .94, as estimated by Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo
[7]. The responses of the key aggregates are now dramatically different
depending on whether the rate of time preference is fixed or flexible.
Starting with the response of consumption, note that whereas in the
fixed time preference case consumption is persistently below its steady-
statelevel following the shock, with flexible timepreferenceconsumption
actually exceeds its steady-state level by a modest amount for a while.
This is possible because of the persistently greater response of output
following the innovation to government spending, which is in turn pri-
marily attributable to the response of capital. Effort also increases by
more in the fixed time preference case than in the flexible time prefer-
ence case, but it is the qualitative difference in the response of capital
in each case that plays the key role in the response of output. Under
fixed time preference, the shock to government purchases is smoothed in
part by running down the capital stock. Under flexible time preference,
households accumulate capital to smooth out the effect of the shock.
This qualitative difference in the response of capital also explains the
differences in the response of the real interest rates and real wages.
We also ran impulse responses under alternative assumptions on cr,
the utility curvature parameter, and Ii, the depreciation rate, though we
will only breifly describe the results of those execises here.
With near-logarithmic utility (cr = 1.001) the impact, transitional
and long-run effects of both transitory and permanent shocks are to all
intents and purposes identicalunder both fixed and flexible time prefer-
ence specifications. This is not surprising, given that the coefficients of
the linearized system depend only on Vu (1 - cr) and Vuu (1 - cr), and not
Vu and Vuu directly. Beyond simply looking at the equations, however,
we haveyet to formulate a good intuitiveexplanation-perhaps in terms
of countervailing income and substitution effects---Qf why this should be
the case.
19What happens if we set 0 = 0.1 instead of 0.03551 For temporary
shocks, the primary consequence of choosing a higher depreciation rate
is to exacerbate the impact effects of the shocks. For permanent shocks,
the higher depreciation rate makes little difference for the response of
consumption. The impact effect on effort is slightly stronger under the
assumption offixed time preference. "There is also a noticeabledifference
in the long-run response ofeffort, with theflexible timepreference model
yielding a larger long-run response. The paths of output become quali-
tatively more similar with high depreciation, and the long-run responses
are enhanced.
6 Conclusions
The manner in which the spending decisions of governments affect the
aggregate economy is one of the central questions in macroeconomics.
In this paper we have extended the existing literature on the equilib-
rium approach to fiscal policy to allow for endogenous time preference,
thereby generating an upward-sloping long-run supply curve for capital.
This contrasts with the existing analyses which assume a perfectly elas-
tic long-run supply curve for capital at the representative agent's rate
of time preference. We showed that generalizing the analysis in this
manner enhances the output effects of persistent changes in government
purchases. The reason for this is the enhanced effect on capital accumu-
lation of permanent changes in wealth. In a surprising Keynesian twist,
we showed that it is possible for steady state consumption to increase
in response to a permanent change in government purchases. This is in
direct contrast to the standard model with fixed time preference, where
consumption must always fall in response to increased government pur-
chases.
The analysis in this paper was conducted under the assumption that
all government purchases were financed by lump-sum taxes. An obvious
extension,which we arecurrentlypursuing, allowsfor distortionarytaxes
on labor and capital. A number of other areas for future research also
suggest themselves. For example, is it possible to improve the perfor-
mance ofexisting dynamic general equilibrium models in terms of their
ability to explain cyclical movements in aggregate activity by altering
preferences to allow for endogenous time preference.
Finally, it is important to be clear about what is sacrificed in moving
to a model with endogenous time preference. In relaxing the assumption
of a fixed discount factor, there are many directions one could move in.
What's more, in relaxing the fixity of time preference, one faces 'trade-
offs' along several dimensions. First ofall, recursivity and stationarity-
implying time-consistency and amenability to dynamic programming-
20need not necessarily be maintained, though the tractability afforded by
recursive, stationary preferences is costly to forego. Likewise, should the
preferences be consistent with the expected utility hypothesis? Numer-
ous arguments have been madefor moving away from the von Neumann-
Morgenstern framework-for example, Epstein and Zin [12), Farmer [13]
and Weil [26), to cite but a few. In the interest of deviating as little
as possible from the standard model, so as not to cloud our conclusions
in a multiplicity of alterations, we opted to maintain consistency with
expected utility. Finally, should preferences be consistent with non-
stochastic balanced growth? This is a feature of the standard model,
when rnomentary utility is taken to be homogeneous of a fixed degree
or logarithmically homogeneous in consumption. We would like to pre-
serve this feature, but as one can see from inspection of Epstein's form
for expected-utility-consistent stationary, recursive preferences, this will
only be possible if the discount factor is fixed. I? Apparently, the only
intersection of these sets of preferences-stationary and recursive, con-
sistent with expected utility and consistent with balanced growth-is
the standard time-additive utility function, with homogeneous or loga-
rithmic momentary utility.'s
7 Appendix: Restrictions on vu, Vuu and (7
One can consult the papers of Epstein [11], Mendoza [23] or Obstfeld
[24] for conditions on utility and discounting which guarantee long-run
stability in capital accumulation models with flexible time preference of
the sort considered above. Putting aside some of the more technical as-
pects ofthese conditions, the basic idea is to guarantee that the long-run
capital supply curve slopes up-though this is clearly not a necessary
condition. Ifthe discount factor depends on consumption, and consump-
tion is increasing in steady-state capital, then the discount factor should
be decreasing in consumption. The same can be said if the discount
factor depends on consumption and leisure, and these are increasing in
capital-the discount factor should be decreasing in consumption and
leisure.
In our model, these conditionstranslate into restrictions on the three
parameters lJu , lJuu and u. The parameter q figures prominently since .
our form of utility lets u 'intermediate' the effect of consumption and
leisure on discounting.
Epstein and Obstfeld consider models with utility defined only over
"In order to be consistent with balanced growth, the intertemporal marginal rate
ofsubstitution in consumption must be independent of the scale of consumption.
ISThis conjecture is based on results in (10], [11] and [9].
21consumption. Recalling here that
[
clO] i-a
U(C I) = -'-::--~-
, 1- 0" '
and following Mendoza, we may state these conditions with respect to
the 'composite' good c/O, which will be increasing in the level of steady-
state capital. Let v (r) = r i - a / (1 - o) We then require, with respect
to ii, v < OJ v' > 0; and In(-v] convex. This will be the case if, as we've
assumed throughout, 0 > l.
With respect to discounting, let 4>(r) = -In,8(v(r)]. We require, in
addition to the obvious 4> > 0, that: 4>' > 0; 4>" < OJ and exp(4)(r)] v'(r)
nonincreasing. A little algebra reveals that these conditions translate
into the following restrictions on /I", /I"" and 0:
/I" > 0,
o




/I" < --1' 0-
These three conditions define, for a given 0 > 1, a simple region in
(/I", /I",,)-space. The size of the region increases as 0 approaches one. In
particular, for any /I" we'd like to consider, there's a maximum feasible
choice of o.
The choiceofmorespecific functional forms for ,8 can impose sharper
restrictions. For example, the form
,8(u) = 1- e"" ("'I> 0)
has the further property that (1-,8) /1""+,8/1,, = O. Thus, once we select
a value of ,8 for the steady state, we've restricted ourselves to a smaller
subset of the collection of feasible /I-pairs. For any /I" there is again a
maximum feasible o.
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LONG-RUN ELASTICITIES FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF ~ = V (<7 - 1)
REALISTIC INVESTMENT SHARE, LOW DEPRECIATION
~= 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.75 1.00
n .1976 .1977 .1980 .1983 .1986 .1989 .1990
c -.0493 -.0331 .0138 .0495 .1001 .1442 .1516
z .0000 .0387 .1506 .2356 .3565 .4617 .4758
k .1976 .2364 .3486 .4339 .5551 .6606 .6784
y .1976 .2140 .2613 .2973 .3483 .3928 .3988
dy/dg .9880 1.0698 1.3606 1.4863 1.7417 1.9641 1.9942
LONG-RUN ELASTICITIES FOR VARIOUS VALUES OF ~ = Vu (<7 - 1)
STANDARD DEPRECIATION, HIGH INVESTMENT SHARE
~= 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.75 1.00
n .2275 .2298 .2379 .2456 .2598 .2772 .2808
c -.0568 -.0438 .0002 .0421 .1200 .2152 .2348
z .0000 .0324 .1420 .2463 .4403 .6774 .7263
k .2275 .2622 .3799 .4919 .7001 .9546 1.0071
y .2275 .2434 .2975 .3490 .4447 .5617 .5858
dy/dg 1.1375 1.2170 1.4877 1.7452 2.2236 2.8085 2.9292
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